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Promise to purchase ( Top
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Another important issue in Murabahah financing which has been subject
of debate between the contemporary Shariah Scholars is that the
bank/financier cannot enter into an actual sale at the time when the client
seeks murabahah financing from him, because the required commodity is
not owned by the bank at this stage and, as explained earlier, one cannot
sell a commodity not owned by him, nor can he effect a forward sale. He
is, therefore, bound to purchase the commodity from the supplier, then
he can sell it to the client after having its physical or constructive
possession. On the other hand, if the client is not bound to purchase
the commodity after the financier has purchased it from the supplier,
the financier may be confronted with a situation where he has incurred
huge expenses to acquire the commodity, but the client refuses to purchase
it. The commodity may be of such a nature that it has no common demand
in the market and is very difficult to dispose of. In this case the financier
may suffer unbearable loss.
Solution to this problem is sought in the murabahah arrangement by asking
the client to sign a promise to purchase the commodity when it is acquired
by the financier. Instead of being a bilateral contract of forward sale,
it is a unilateral promise from the client which binds himself and not
the financier. Being a one-sided promise, it is distinguishable from the
bilateral forward contract.
This solution is subjected to the objection that a unilateral promise
creates a moral obligation but it cannot be enforced, according to Shariah,
by the courts of law. This leads us to the question whether or not a one-sided
promise is enforceable in Shariah. The general impression is that
it is not, but before accepting this impression at its face value, we
will have to examine it in the light of the original sources of Shariah.
A thorough study of the relevant material in the books of Islamic jurisprudence
would show that the fuqaha (the Muslim jurists) have different views
on the subject. Their views may be summarized as follows:
1. Many of them are of the opinion that 'fulfilling a promise' is
a noble quality and it is advisable for the promisor to observe it, and
its violation is reproachable, but it is neither mandatory (wajib), nor
enforceable through courts. This view is attributed to Imam Abu Hanifah,
Imam al-Shafii, Imam Ahmad and to some Maliki jurists 1 However
as will be shown later, many Hanafi and Maliki and some Shafii
jurists do not subscribe to this view.
2. A number of the Muslim jurists are of the view that fulfilling
a promise is mandatory and a promisor is under moral as well as legal
obligation to fulfil his promise. According to them, promise can be enforced
through courts of law. This view is ascribed to Samurah b. Jundub
the well known companion of the Holy Prophet 
Umar b. Abdul Aziz, Hasan al-Basri, Said b. al-Ashwa, Ishaq
b. Rahwaih and Imam al-Bukhari. The same is the view of some Maliki jurists,
and it is preferred by Ibn-al-Arabi and Ibn-al-Shat, and endorsed
by al-Ghazzali, the famous Shafii jurist, who says the promise is
binding, if it is made in absolute terms. The same is the view of Ibn
Shubrumah. The third view is presented by some Maliki jurists. They say
that in normal conditions, promise is not binding, but if the promisor
has caused the promise to incur some expenses or undertake some labor
or liability on the basis of promise, it is mandatory on him to fulfil
his promise for which he may be compelled by the courts.
Some contemporary scholars have claimed that the jurists who have accepted
the binding nature of a promise have done so only with regard to unilateral
gifts or other voluntary payments, but none of them has accepted the binding
nature of a promise to effect a bilateral commercial or monetary transaction.
However, based on a close study, this notion does not seem to be correct,
because the Maliki and Hanafi jurists have allowed 'Bai bil wafa'
on the basis of binding promise. Bai bil wafa' is a special kind
of sale whereby the purchaser of an immovable property undertakes that
whenever the seller will give him the price back, he will resell the house
to him. The question of validity of 'Baibil wafa' has already been
discussed in detail in the first chapter while explaining the concept
of house financing on the basis of 'diminishing musharakah'. The gist
of the discussion is that if repurchase by the seller is made a condition
for the original sale, it is not a valid transaction, but if the parties
have entered into the original sale unconditionally, but the seller has
signed a separate and independent promise to repurchase the sold property,
this promise will be binding on the promisor and enforceable through the
courts. The binding nature of the promise in this case has been admitted
by both Maliki and Hanafi jurists. 1
Obviously, this promise does not relate to a gift. It is a promise to
effect a sale in future. Still, the Maliki and Hanafi jurists have accepted
it as binding on the promisor and enforceable through the courts. It is
a clear proof of the fact that the jurists who hold the promises to be
binding do not restrict it to the promises of gifts etc. The same principle
is applicable, according to them, to the promises whereby the promisor
undertakes to enter into a bilateral contract in future.
In fact, the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet are
very particular about fulfilling promises. The Holy Quran says:
And fulfil the covenant. Surely, the covenant will be asked about (in
the Hereafter) (Bani Israil : 34)

O those who believe, why do you say what you not do. It invites Allah's
anger that you say what you not do. (al-Saf:2 to 3)
Imam Abu Bakr al-Jassas has said that this verse of the Holy Quran
indicates that if one undertakes to do something, no matter whether it
is a worship or a contract, it is obligatory on him to do it. The Holy
Prophet is reported to have
said:

There are three distinguishing features of a hypocrite: when he speaks,
tells a lie, when he promises, he backs out and when he is given something
in trust, he breaches the trust. 2
This is only an example. There is a large number of injunctions in the
ahadith of the Holy Prophet where
it is ordained to fulfil the promises and it is clearly prohibited to
back out, except for a valid reason.
Therefore, it is evident from these injunctions that fulfilling promise
is obligatory. However, the question whether or not a promise is enforceable
in courts depends on the nature of the promise. There are certainly some
sorts of promises which cannot be enforced through courts. For example,
at the time of engagement the parties promise to go through the marriage.
These promises create a moral obligation, but obviously they cannot be
enforced through courts of law. But in commercial dealings, where a party
has given an absolute promise to sell or purchase something and the other
party has incurred liabilities on that basis, there is no reason why such
a promise should not be enforced. Therefore, on the basis of the clear
injunctions of Islam, if the parties have agreed that this particular
promise will be binding on the promisor, it will be enforceable.
This is not a question pertaining to murabahah alone. If promises are
not enforceable in the commercial transactions, it may seriously jeopardize
commercial activities. If somebody orders a trader to bring for him a
certain commodity and promises to purchase it from him, on the basis of
which the trader imports it from abroad by incurring huge expenses, how
can it be allowed for the former to refuse to purchase it? There is nothing
in the Holy Quran or Sunnah which prohibits the making of such promises
enforceable.
It is on these grounds that the Islamic Fiqh Academy Jeddah has made the
promises in commercial dealings binding on the promisor with the following
conditions,
(a) it should be one-sided promise.
(b) the promise must have caused the promise to incur some liabilities
(c) If the promise is to purchase something, the actual sale must
take place at the appointed time by the exchange of offer and acceptance.
Mere promise itself should not be taken as the concluded sale
(d) If the promisor backs out of his promise, the court may force
him either to purchase the commodity or pay actual damages to the seller.1
The actual damages will include the actual monetary loss suffered by him,
but will not include the opportunity cost.
On this basis, it is allowed that the client promises to the financier
that he will purchase the commodity after the latter acquires it from
the supplier. This promise will be binding on him and may be enforced
through courts in the manner explained above. This promise does not amount
to actual sale. It will be simply a promise and the actual sale will take
place after the commodity is acquired by the financier for which exchange
of offer and acceptance will be necessary.
Securities Against Murabahah Price ( Top
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Another issue regarding murabahah financing is that the murabahah price
is payable at a later date. The seller/financier naturally wants to make
sure that the price will be paid at the due date. for this purpose, he
may ask the client to furnish a security to his satisfaction. The security
may be in the form of a mortgage or a hypothecation or some kind of lien
or charge. Some basic rules about this security must, therefore, be kept
in mind.
1. The security can be claimed rightfully where the transaction has
created a liability or a debt. No security can be asked from a person
who has not incurred a liability or debt. As explained earlier, the procedure
of murabahah financing comprises of different transactions carried out
at different stages. In the earlier stages of the procedure, the client
does not incur a debt. It is only after the commodity is sold to him by
the financier on credit that the relationship of a creditor and debtor
comes into existence. Therefore, the proper way in a transaction of murabahah
would be that the financier asks for a security after he has actually
sold the commodity to the client and the price has become due on him,
because at this stage the client incurs a debt. However, it is also permissible
that the client furnishes a security at earlier stages, but after the
murabahah price is determined. In this case, if the security is possessed
by the financier, it will remain at his risk, meaning thereby that if
it is destroyed before the actual sale to the client, he will have either
to pay the market price of the mortgaged asset, and cancel the agreement
of murabahah, or sell the commodity required by the client and deduct
the market price of the mortgaged asset from the price of the sold property.
(2) It is also permissible that the sold commodity itself is given
to the seller as a security. Some scholars are of the opinion that this
can only be done after the purchaser has taken its delivery and not before.
It means that the purchaser shall take its delivery, either physical or
constructive, from the seller, then give it back to him as mortgage, so
that the transaction of mortgage is distinguished from the transaction
of sale. However, after studying the relevant material, it can be concluded
that the earlier jurists have put this condition in cash sales only and
not in credit sales.
Therefore, it is not necessary that the purchaser takes the delivery of
the sold property before he surrenders it as mortgage to the seller. The
only requirement would be that the point of time whereby the property
is held to be mortgaged should necessarily be specified, because from
that point of time, the property will be held by the seller in a different
capacity which should be clearly earmarked. For example, A sold a car
to B on first of january for a price of Rs. 500,000/- to be paid on 30th
June. A asked B to give a security for payment at the due date. B has
not yet taken delivery of the car and he offered to A that he should keep
the car as a mortgage from 2nd January. If the car is destroyed before
2nd of January the sale will be terminated and nothing will be payable
by B. But if the car is destroyed after the second of January, sale is
not terminated, but it will be subject to the rules prescribed for the
destruction of a mortgage. According to Hanafi jurists, in this case,
the seller will have to bear the loss of the car, to the extent of its
market price or its agreed sale price, whichever is lesser. Therefore,
if the market price of the car was 450,000/- he can claim only the remaining
part of the agreed sale price (i.e. Rs. 50,000/- in the above example).
If the market price of the car is Rs. 500,000/- or higher, nothing can
be claimed from the purchaser.
This is the view of Hanafi School. The Shafii and Hanbali jurists
hold that if the car is destroyed by the negligence of the mortgagee,
he will have to bear the loss, according to its market price, but if the
car is destroyed without any fault on his part, he will not be liable
to anything, and the purchaser will bear the loss and will have to pay
the full price.
It is clear from the above example that the possession of A over the car
as a seller carries effects and consequences different from his possession
as a mortgagee and therefore it is necessary that the point of time on
which the car is held by him as a mortgagee should clearly be defined.
Otherwise different capacities will be mixed up giving rise to dispute
and rendering the security invalid.
Guaranteeing the Murabahah ( Top
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The seller in a murabahah financing can also ask the purchaser/client
to furnish a guarantee from a third party. In case of default in the payment
of price at the due date, the seller may have recourse to the guarantor,
who will be liable to pay the amount guaranteed by him. The rules of Shari'ah
regarding guarantee are fully discussed in the books of Islamic fiqh.
However, I would point out to two burning issues in the context of Islamic
banking.
1. The guarantor in the contemporary commercial atmosphere does not
normally guarantee a payment without a fee charged from the original debtor.
The classical Fiqh literature is almost unanimous on the point that the
guarantee is a voluntary transaction and no fee can be charged on a guarantee.
The most the guarantor can do is to claim his actual secretarial expenses
incurred in offering the guarantee, but the guarantee itself should be
free of charge. The reason for this prohibition is that the person who
advances money to another person as a loan cannot charge a fee for advancing
a loan, because it falls under the definition of riba or interest which
is prohibited. The guarantor should be subject to this prohibition all
the more, because he does not advance money. He only undertakes to pay
a certain amount on behalf of the original debtor in case he defaults
in payment. If the person who actually pays money cannot charge a fee,
how can fee be charged by a person who has merely undertaken to pay and
did not pay anything in actual terms?
Suppose, A has borrowed 100 US dollars from B who asked him to produce
a guarantor. C says to A, "I pay off your debt to B right now, but
you will have to pay me 110 dollars at a later date." Obviously 10
dollars charged from A are not allowed, being interest. Then D comes to
A and says, "I stand as a guarantor to you, but you will have to
pay me 10 dollars for this service." If we allow to charge a fee
for guarantee, it will mean that C cannot charge 10 dollars, despite the
fact that he has actually paid the amount, and D can charge 10 dollars,
despite the fact that he has merely committed himself to pay only when
A fails to pay. This being unfair apparently, the classical Muslim jurists
have forbidden the charging of a fee for guarantee, so that both C and
D, in the above example, may stand on equal footing.
However, some contemporary scholars are considering the problem from a
different angle. They feel that guarantee has become a necessity, especially
in international trade where the sellers and the buyers do not know each
other, and the payment of the price by the purchaser cannot be simultaneous
with the supply of the goods. There has to be an intermediary who can
guarantee the payment. It is utterly difficult to find the guarantors
who can provide this service free of charge in required numbers. Keeping
these realities in view, some Shari'ah scholars of our time are adopting
a different approach. They say that the prohibition of guarantee fee is
not based on any specific injunction of the Holy Qur'an or the Sunnah
of the Holy Prophet . It
has been deduced from the prohibition of riba as one of its ancillary
consequences. Moreover, guarantees in the past were of simple nature.
In today's commercial activities, the guarantor sometimes needs a number
of studies and a lot of secretarial work. Therefore, they opine, the prohibition
of the guarantee fee should be reviewed in this perspective. The question
still needs further research and should be placed before a larger forum
of scholars. However, unless a definite ruling is given by such a forum,
no guarantee fee should be charged or paid by an Islamic financial institution.
Instead, they can charge or pay a fee to cover expenses incurred in the
process of issuing a guarantee.
Penalty of Default ( Top
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Another problem in murabahah financing is that if the client defaults
in payment of the price at the due date, the price cannot be increased.
In interest-based loans, the amount of loan keeps on increasing according
to the period of default. But in murabahah financing, once the price is
fixed, it cannot be increased. This restriction is sometimes exploited
by dishonest clients who deliberately avoid to pay the price at its due
date, because they know that they will not have to pay any additional
amount on account of default.
This characteristic of murabahah should not create a big problem in a
country where all the banks and financial institutions are run on Islamic
principles, because the government or the central bank may develop a system
where such defaultors may be penalized by depriving them from obtaining
any facility from any financial institution. This system may serve a a
deterrent against deliberate defaults. However, in the countries where
the Islamic banks and financial institutions are working in isolation
from the majority of financial institutions run on the basis of interest,
this system can hardly work, because even if the client is deprived to
avail of a facility from an Islamic bank, he can approach the conventional
institutions.
In order to solve this problem, some contemporary scholars have suggested
that the dishonest clients who default in payment deliberately should
be made liable to pay compensation to the Islamic bank for the loss it
may have suffered on account of default. They suggest that the amount
of this compensation may be equal to the profit given by that bank to
its depositors during the period of default. For example, the defaulter
has paid the price three months after the due date. If the bank has given
to its depositors a profit at the rate of 5%, the client has to pay 5%
more as compensation for the loss of the bank. However, the scholars who
allow this compensation make it subject to the folowing conditions:
(a) The defaulter should be given a grace period of at least one month
after the maturity date during which he must be given weekly notices warning
him that he should pay the price, otherwise he will have to pay compensation.
(b) It is proved beyond doubt that the client is defaulting without
valid excuse. If it appears that his default is due to poverty, no compensation
can be claimed from him. Indeed, he must be given respite until he is
able to pay, because the Holy Quran has expressly said,

And if he (the debtor) is short of funds, then he must be given respite
until he is well off. (2:280)
(c) The compensation is allowed only if the investment account of
the Islamic bank has earned some profit to be distributed to the depositors.
If the investment account of the bank has not earned profit during the
period of default, no compensation shall be claimed from the client.
This concept of compensation, however, is not accepted by the majority
of the present day scholars. (including the author). It is the considered
opinion of such scholars that this suggestion neither conforms to the
principles of Shariah nor is it able to solve the problem of default.
First of all, any additional amount charged from a debtor is riba. In
the days of jahiliyyah (before Islam) the people used to charge additional
amounts from their debtors when they were not able to pay at the due date.
they used to say,

Either you pay off the debt or you increase the payable amount.
The aforementioned suggestion of paying compensation to the creditor/seller
resembles the same attitude.
It can be argued that the above suggestion is theoretically different
from the practice of jahilliyah in that the suggestion is to grant the
debtor a grace period of one month to make sure that he is avoiding payment
without a valid cause and to exempt him from compensation if it appears
that his non-payment is due to poverty or a hardship. But in practical
application of the concept, these conditions are hardly fulfilled, because
every debtor may claim that his default is due to his financial inability
at the due date, and it is very difficult for a financial institution
to hold an inquiry about the financial position of each client and to
verify whether or not he was able to pay. What the banks normally do is
that they presume that every client was able to pay unless he has been
declared as bankrupt or insolvent. It means that the concession allowed
in the suggestion can be enjoyed only by the insolvent people. Obviously,
insolvency is a rare phenomenon, and in this rare situation, even the
interest-based banks cannot normally recover interest from the borrower.
Therefore, the suggestion leaves no practical and meaningful difference
between an interest based financing and an Islamic financing.
So far as grace period is concerned, it is a minor concession which is
sometimes given by the conventional banks as well. Once again, in practical
terms, there is no material difference between interest and the late payment
charged as compensation.
It is argued in favor of charging compensation that the Holy Prophet ?
has condemned the person who delays the payment of his dues without a
valid cause. According to the well-known hadith he has said,

The well-off person who delays the payment of his debt, subjects himself
to punishment and disgrace."
The argument runs that the Holy Prophet ? has permitted to inflict a punishment
on such a person. The punishments may be of different kinds, including
the imposition of a monetary penalty. But this argument overlooks the
fact that even if it is assumed that imposing fine or a monetary penalty
is allowed in Shariah,1 it is imposed by a court of law and is normally
paid to the government. Nobody has allowed a situation where an aggrieved
party imposes the fine on its own (and for its own benefit) without a
judgment of a court, competent to decide the matter.
Moreover, had it been a recognized punishment, it should have been imposed
even if the investment account has earned no profit during that period,
because the guilt of the defaulter is established and it has no nexus
with the profit of the investment account of the bank.
In fact, the suggestion of compensation equal to the rate of profit of
the investment account is based on the concept of opportunity cost of
money. This concept is foreign to the principles of Shariah. Islam does
not recognize opportunity cost of money, because after the elimination
of interest from the economy, money has no definite return. It is always
exposed to loss as well as it has the ability to earn a profit. And it
is the risk of loss which makes it entitled to gain a return.
Another point is worth attention. The one who defaults in payment of debt
is, at the most, like a thief or a usurper. But the study of the rules
prescribed for theft and usurpation would show that a thief has been subjected
to very severe punishment of amputating his hands, but he was never asked
to pay an additional mount to compensate the victim of theft. Similarly,
if a person has usurped the money of another person, he may be punished
by way of tazir, but no Muslim jurist has ever imposed on him a
financial penalty to compensate the owner.
Imam al-Shafii is of the view that if someone usurps the land of
another person, he will have to pay the rent of the land according to
the market rate. But if he has usurped money, he will return the equal
amount of money and not more.
All these rules go a long way to prove that the opportunity cost of money
is never recognized by the Islamic Shariah, because, as explained
above, money has no definite return, nor any intrinsic utility.
On the basis of what is stated above, the idea of compensation to be charged
from a defaulter is not approved by most of the contemporary scholars.
The question was thoroughly discussed in the annual session of Islamic
Fiqh Academy, Jeddah, and it was resolved that no such compensation is
allowed in Shariah.
All this discussion relates to the impermissibility of the proposed compensation
in Shariah. Now it is to be noted that this proposal does not solve the
problem of default at all. To the contrary, it may encourage the debtors
to commit as much default as they wish. The reason is that, according
to this suggestion, the defaulter is asked to pay compensation equal to
the return earned by the depositors during the period of default. It is
evident that the rate of return earned by the depositors is always less
than the rate of profit paid by the customer in a Murabahah transaction.
Therefore, the customer will be paying after default, much less than he
was paying before the default. Therefore, he would willingly accept to
pay this amount and not pay the amount of price which he will invest in
a more profitable activity. Suppose the rate of profit agreed in a murabahah
transaction of six moths is 15% p.a. and the rate of profit declared to
the depositors is 10%. p.a. It means that if the client withholds the
price of murabahah after its maturity date and keeps it for another six
months, he will have to pay the compensation at the rate of 10% p.a. which
is much less than the rate of original murabahah (i.e. 15%). As such he
will default and enjoy another facility for the next six months at a lesser
rate.
This proposal, therefore, is not only against Shariah, but also deficient
in meeting the problem of default. The Alternative suggestion The question
now arises as to how the banks and financial institutions may solve this
problem. If nothing is charged from the defaulters, it may be a greater
incentive for a dishonest person to default continuously. Here is the
answer to this question:
We have already mentioned that the real solution to this problem is to
develop a system where the defaulters are duly punished by depriving them
from enjoying a financial facility in future. However, as commented earlier,
this may be only where the whole banking system is based on Islamic principles,
or the Islamic banks are given due protection against defaulters. Therefore,
up to a time when this goal is reached, we may need some other alternative.
For this purpose it was suggested that the client, when entering into
a murabahah transaction, should undertake that in case he defaults in
payment at the due date, he will pay a specified amount to a charitable
fund maintained by the bank. It must be ensured that no part of this amount
shall form part of the income of the bank. However, the bank may establish
a charitable fund for this purpose and all amounts credited therein shall
be exclusively used for purely charitable purpose approved by the Shariah.
The bank may also advance interest-free loans to the needy persons from
this charitable fund.
This proposal is based on a ruling given by some Maliki jurists who say
that if a debtor is asked to pay an additional amount in case of default,
it is not allowed by Shari'ah, because it amounts to charging interest.
However, in order to assure the creditor of prompt payment, the debtor
may undertake to give some amount in charity in case of default. This
is, in fact, a sort of Yamin (vow) which is a self-imposed penalty to
keep oneself away from default. Normally, such 'vows' create a moral or
religious obligation and are not enforceable through courts. However,
some Maliki jurists allow can be made it justiceable, and there is nothing
in the Holy Qur'an or in the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet which
forbids making this 'vow' enforceable through the courts of law. Therefore,
in cases of genuine need, this view can be acted upon. But, while implementing
this proposal, the following points must be kept in mind.
1. The proposal is meant only to pressurize the debtors on paying
their dues promptly and not to increase the income of the creditor / financier,
nor to compensate him for his opportunity cost. Therefore, it must be
ensured that no part of the penalty forms part of the income of the bank
in any case, nor can it be used to pay taxes or to set-off any liability
of the financier.
2. Since the amount of penalty is not deserved by the financier as
his income, but it goes to charity, it may be any amount willfully undertaken
by the debtor. It can also be determined on per cent per annum basis.
Therefore, it may serve as a real deterrent against deliberate default,
unlike the former suggestion of compensation which, as explained earlier,
may tend to encourage the defaults.
3. Since the penalty undertaken by the client is originally a self-undertaken
vow, and not penalty charged by the financier, the agreement should reflect
this concept. Therefore, the proper wording of the penalty clause would
be on the following pattern,
"The client hereby undertakes that if he defaults in payment of any
of his dues under this agreement, he shall pay to the charitable account/fund
maintained by the Bank/Financier a sum calculated on the basis of ...%
per annum for each day of default unless he establishes through the evidence
satisfactory to the Bank/financier that his non-payment at the due date
was caused due to poverty or some other factors beyond his control."
4. Being a vow of charitable act, it was originally permissible for
the client to give the stipulated amount to any charity of his own choice,
but in order to ensure that he will pay, the charitable account or fund
maintained by the financier/bank is specified in the proposed undertaking.
This specific undertaking does not violate any principle of Shariah. However,
it is necessary that the bank or the financial institution maintains a
separate fund, or at least, a separate account for this purpose and the
amounts credited to that account must be spent in well-defined charities
known to the client/debtor.
This proposal has now been implemented successfully in a large number
of Islamic financial institution.
No Roll Over in Murabahah ( Top
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Another rule which must be remembered and fully complied with is that
murabahah transaction cannot be rolled over for a further period. In an
interest-based financing, if a customer of the bank cannot pay at the
due date for any reason, he may request the bank to extend the facility
for another term. If the bank agrees, the facility is rolled over on the
terms and conditions mutually agreed at that point of time, whereby the
newly agreed rate of interest is applied to the new term. It actually
means that another loan of the same amount is re-advanced to the borrower.
Some Islamic banks or financial institutions, who misunderstood the concept
of murabahah and took it as merely a mode of financing analogous to an
interest-based loan, started using the concept of roll-over to murabahah
also. If the client requests them to extend the maturity date of murabahah,
they roll it over and extend the period of payment on an additional mark-up
charged from the client which practically means that another separate
murabahah is booked on the same commodity. This practice is totally against
the well-settled principles of Shariah.
It should be clearly understood that murabahah is not a loan. It is the
sale of a commodity the price of which is deferred to a specific date.
Once the commodity is sold, its ownership is passed on to the client.
It is no more a property of the seller. What the seller can legitimately
claim is the agreed price which has become a debt payable by the buyer.
Therefore, there is no question of effecting another sale on the same
commodity between the same parties. The roll-over in murabahah is nothing
but interest pure and simple because it is an agreement to charge an additional
amount on the debt created by the murabahah sale.
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